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merican corporate law tolerates green businesses.  Green 
business decisions that are informed, disinterested, and made in 
the good-faith best interests of the firm will enjoy deference pursuant 
to the business judgment rule, whether the decisions maximize 
shareholder profits or sacrifice them in the name of sustainability.1  
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Wolfstone, and my symposium copanelists for their insights, ideas, and comments. 
1 See generally Judd F. Sneirson, Green Is Good: Sustainability, Profitability, and a 
New Paradigm for Corporate Governance, 94 IOWA L. REV. 987 (2009) [hereinafter 
Sneirson, Green Is Good] (debunking the myth of shareholder wealth maximization and 
demonstrating corporate law’s compatibility with sustainable business practices). 
A 
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Corporate law generally stops there, however, and neither encourages 
green business efforts nor particularly discourages them. 
States are more or less uniform in this approach, and thus new 
businesses selecting a state of incorporation have had no green basis 
for preferring one state’s corporate laws to those of another.  Recent 
efforts in Oregon to green its corporate law signal a change to this 
status quo.  Perhaps these efforts portend a new round of interstate 
competition for corporate charters, as states like Oregon begin to vie 
with one another to attract green business charters and their associated 
revenue. 
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part I recounts previous bouts of 
interstate competition for corporate charters and notes the “race-to-
the-bottom” and “race-to-the-top” theories that purport to explain 
their results.  Part I then describes the current movement toward green 
or sustainable business practices, notes the compatibility of these 
practices with current corporate law, and posits that the trend will 
trigger a new race among states to attract corporate charters—not to 
the bottom nor to the top but rather “to the left.”2  Part II opens with a 
description of Oregon’s recent efforts to make its corporate law more 
amenable to green businesses, and then the Article proposes a 
comprehensive agenda for greening a state’s corporate code.  Some of 
these suggestions take the form of generally applicable provisions 
consistent with current corporate law and aimed at clarifying its 
compatibility with green business practices.  The remaining 
suggestions form a set of optional provisions that allow firms wishing 
to be governed by more stringent, green business standards to elect to 
do so. 
I 
INTERSTATE COMPETITION FOR CORPORATE CHARTERS 
A.  The Race to the Bottom and the Race to the Top 
Under the “internal affairs doctrine,” courts apply the law of a 
firm’s state of incorporation to resolve matters of corporate 
 
2 The metaphor references the association of sustainability with the political left, 
although green business and its potential profits appeal to the entire political spectrum.  
Indeed, studies have shown that sustainable business efforts tend to enhance rather than 
sacrifice profits.  See Judd F. Sneirson, Doing Well by Doing Good: Leveraging Due Care 
for Better, More Socially Responsible Corporate Decisionmaking, 3 CORP. GOVERNANCE 
L. REV. 438, 440 & n.3, 449 (2007) [hereinafter Sneirson, Doing Well] (citing studies); 
Sneirson, Green Is Good, supra note 1, at 1009 & n.115, 1010 & n.117 (same). 
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governance.3  Thus, in deciding whether to pierce a firm’s corporate 
veil, or whether a firm’s fiduciaries breached their duties to the 
company or its shareholders, the law of the charter-granting 
jurisdiction applies.4  This doctrine has been universally accepted and 
it effectively enables states seeking firms’ tax and other revenue to 
compete with one another for incorporation business.5  States have 
done so by appealing to the corporate managers who make the firm’s 
incorporation (or reincorporation) decisions.6 
Two theories eventually emerged to explain the basis on which 
these states competed.  The first of these—the “race to the bottom”—
posits that states attract corporate managers to their jurisdictions by 
offering management-friendly corporate laws that place no limits on 
permissible corporate purposes, respect limited liability, afford 
managers significant decision-making discretion, and otherwise erect 
obstacles to shareholder litigation.7  The theory explains both how 
New Jersey wrested corporate charters from then-dominant New York 
at the turn of the last century, and how Delaware subsequently 
attracted those firms to reincorporate under its now-dominant 
corporate law regime.8 
 
3 STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS § 1.3(A), at 14 
(2002) (noting that the internal affairs doctrine does not require any meaningful 
connection between the firm and its state of incorporation). 
4 See, e.g., Fletcher v. Atex, Inc., 68 F.3d 1451, 1456 (2d Cir. 1995) (“The district court 
correctly noted that [u]nder New York choice of law principles, [t]he law of the state of 
incorporation determines when the corporate form will be disregarded and liability will be 
imposed on shareholders.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Paulman v. Kritzer, 219 
N.E.2d 541, 543 (Ill. App. Ct. 1966) (applying Delaware law to determine whether 
directors of a Delaware corporation breached their fiduciary duties), aff’d, 230 N.E.2d 262 
(Ill. 1967). 
5 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 3, § 1.3(A), at 14–15 (describing a “common market for 
corporate charters”).  In so competing, states give effect to the following idea Justice 
Brandeis famously articulated: “It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a 
single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory . . . .”  New State 
Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  Of course, such 
competition has a downside, as Brandeis later noted in Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 
U.S. 517, 559 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (describing what was later termed a “race 
to the bottom” as “[t]he race was one not of diligence but of laxity”). 
6 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 3, § 1.3(A), at 15. 
7 See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 
YALE L.J. 663, 665–70 (1974); see also Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, Federalism and the 
Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. 
REV. 1435, 1440 (1992) (arguing that “state competition produces a race for the top with 
respect to some corporate issues but a race for the bottom with respect to others”). 
8 See Charles M. Yablon, The Historical Race Competition for Corporate Charters and 
the Rise and Decline of New Jersey: 1880–1990, 32 J. CORP. L. 323, 324–31 (2007); see 
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An alternate theory of interstate charter competition argues that 
states race “to the top,” not the bottom, by developing the best and 
most efficient set of corporate laws, which are not necessarily the 
most management-friendly.9  Among other things, race-to-the-top 
adherents argue that investors will be reluctant to invest in, and 
lenders will be reluctant to lend to, firms governed by excessively 
promanagement laws.10  Regardless of which narrative best explains 
the initial corporate charter migration to Delaware, the race to the top 
best explains Delaware corporate law’s continued prominence.11  
Though Delaware corporate law may not always be 
promanagement,12 the richness of its decisional law, the experience of 
its corporate bar, and the expertise and efficiency of its judiciary 
together amply justify Delaware’s current position as the preferred 
state in which to incorporate.13 
 
also D. Gordon Smith, Debate, Response: The Dystopian Potential of Corporate Law, 57 
EMORY L.J. 985, 1006–07 (2008). 
9 See Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the 
Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 255–58 (1977).  See generally ROBERTA ROMANO, 
THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993); William J. Carney, The Political 
Economy of Competition for Corporate Charters, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 303 (1997); Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Managers’ Discretion and Investors’ Welfare: Theories and Evidence, 9 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 540, 554–71 (1984); Daniel R. Fischel, The “Race to the Bottom” 
Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware’s Corporation Law, 76 NW. 
U. L. REV. 913 (1982); Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy 
in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908 (1998); Roberta Romano, The State 
Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 709 (1987). 
10 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 3, § 1.3(A), at 15 (citing empirical studies that support the 
race-to-the-top theory).  Another take on this debate posits that the federal government, not 
interstate charter competition, exerts the most pressure on Delaware corporate law’s 
development.  See generally Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
588 (2003). 
11 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 3, § 1.3(A), at 16. 
12 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (Supp. 2008) (imposing relatively lenient 
requirements on shareholders seeking to inspect corporate books and records); Blasius 
Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 660–61 (Del. Ch. 1988) (applying strict scrutiny 
to management interference with the shareholder franchise); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why 
the North Dakota Publicly Traded Corporations Act Will Fail, 84 N.D. L. REV. 1043, 
1044–45 (2008) (noting that Delaware law has no antitakeover provision and is thus 
friendlier than other states toward hostile takeovers and, by extension, shareholder value). 
13 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 3, § 1.3(A), at 4; see also Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of 
the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 
1062–64 (2000).  But see Judd F. Sneirson, Soft Paternalism for Close Corporations: 
Helping Shareholders Help Themselves, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 899, 903 n.10 (noting that 
closely held corporations tend to incorporate locally for tax and other reasons).  Thus, even 
if another state were to both adopt Delaware corporate law wholesale, including its entire 
body of decisional law, and undercut Delaware’s franchise tax structure, this state would 
still lack Delaware’s bar and judiciary and thus prove an inferior incorporation choice. 
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B.  The Green Business Movement and the Coming Race to the Left 
Green or sustainable businesses take a broader view of corporate 
performance than merely looking at the simple economic return on 
capital investment.  In addition to “the traditional bottom line of 
financial performance,” sustainable firms also mind “their impact on 
the broader economy, the environment, and on the society in which 
they operate.”14  These companies therefore strive to do business 
while “treading as lightly as possible on the earth and its natural 
resources” and, depending on the firm, they may develop “products, 
services, and technologies that contribute to larger societal efforts to 
live more sustainably.”15 
This three-dimensional view of business also serves an accounting 
function: using the triple bottom-line approach, “a firm can measure 
its financial success as well as the extent to which it is ‘reducing (or 
increasing) the options available to future generations’ during a 
particular reporting period.”16  Specifically, while the financial aspect 
of the triple bottom line concerns traditional economic data, the 
environmental component focuses on a firm’s “compliance against 
[environmental] regulations and other standards; the performance of 
internal management systems; trends in energy usage, waste 
production, and recycling; and the use of eco-efficient 
technologies.”17  To complete the picture, the social component “aims 
to assess the impact of an organization . . . on people both inside and 
outside,”18 addressing topics such as “community relations, product 
safety, training and education initiatives, sponsorship, charitable 
donations of money and time, and employment of disadvantaged 
groups.”19  Many companies already voluntarily report in all three of 
these areas.20  Although these reports can vary in format, making it 
 
14 See ANDREW W. SAVITZ WITH KARL WEBER, THE TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE: HOW 
TODAY’S BEST-RUN COMPANIES ARE ACHIEVING ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL SUCCESS—AND HOW YOU CAN TOO, at xii (2006). 
15 See Sneirson, Green Is Good, supra note 1, at 991. 
16 Id. at 991–92 (quoting JOHN ELKINGTON, CANNIBALS WITH FORKS: THE TRIPLE 
BOTTOM LINE OF 21ST CENTURY BUSINESS 92 (1998)); see also MARC J. EPSTEIN, 
MAKING SUSTAINABILITY WORK: BEST PRACTICES IN MANAGING AND MEASURING 
CORPORATE SOCIAL, ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS 223–48 (2008). 
17 ELKINGTON, supra note 16, at 82; see also EPSTEIN, supra note 16, at 230–31 (listing 
information commonly reported by companies). 
18 ELKINGTON, supra note 16, at 87. 
19 Id. at 87–88. 
20 See EPSTEIN, supra note 16, at 223 (reporting that 20% of companies in the Fortune 
Global 250 “included a sustainability section in their annual reports, while 54% published 
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difficult to draw comparisons, the Global Reporting Initiative 
Sustainability Reporting Guidelines, now in their third version, 
provide some standardization.21 
Despite the current economic downturn, the green business 
movement continues to gain momentum.22  Many investors see green 
business efforts in fields such as renewable energy, green building 
materials, and green technology as responsible, profitable responses 
to the current energy, climate change, and economic crises.23  And no 
matter what the industry, companies are embracing green business 
practices more and more—not necessarily out of respect for the 
environment and future generations, but rather because such practices 
often cut energy and other costs, reduce waste, and, on the whole, 
prove efficient and profitable.24 
American corporate law permits firms to pursue these sorts of 
green practices and business plans.  Corporate law contains no 
 
a separate sustainability report”).  For examples from various companies, see Nike, Inc., 
Nike Responsibility: Reporting, http://www.nikebiz.com/responsibility/reporting.html (last 
visited Jan. 7, 2010); Starbucks Coffee Co., Global Responsibility, 
http://www.starbucks.com/aboutus/gr.asp (last visited Jan. 7, 2010); The Timberland Co., 
CSR: Transparency & Accountability, http://www.timberland.com/corp/ 
index.jsp?page=../include/csr_reports (last visited Jan. 7, 2010); Walmart Stores, Inc., 
Global Sustainability Report, http://walmartstores.com/Sustainability/7951.aspx (last 
visited Jan. 7, 2010). 
21 See ELKINGTON, supra note 16, at 82, 84 (noting difficult comparisons); EPSTEIN, 
supra note 16, at 224–25 (discussing the “GRI” guidelines while noting that nearly one 
thousand firms in more than sixty countries use the GRI framework and “34 companies in 
the [Standard & Poor’s] 100 Index use . . . it for their external reporting”); see also 
Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social 
Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1299–1305, 1307–11 (1999) (offering models for 
social and environmental corporate disclosures). 
22 See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME, GLOBAL GREEN NEW DEAL: 
POLICY BRIEF 1–2 (2009), available at http://www.unep.org/pdf/A_Global_Green_New 
_Deal_Policy_Brief.pdf; Christopher Dickey & Tracy McNicoll, Why It’s Time for a 
‘Green New Deal,’ NEWSWEEK, Nov. 10, 2008, at 49–52. 
23 See Nancy Floyd, Speech, 88 OR. L. REV. 343 (2009); Sneirson, Green Is Good, 
supra note 1, at 1010; see also Claire Cain Miller, Venture Firm’s ‘Green’ Funds Top $1 
Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2009, at B1 (reporting on venture capital investments in clean 
technology that address climate change). 
24 See Sneirson, Green Is Good, supra note 1, at 991 n.11, 992 n.15, 1009–10 nn.115–
17 (citing studies and examples); Jared Diamond, Op-Ed., Will Big Business Save the 
Earth?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2009, at WK12 (“Lower consumption of environmental 
resources saves money in the short run.  Maintaining sustainable resource levels and not 
polluting saves money in the long run.  And a clean image—one attained by, say, avoiding 
oil spills and other environmental disasters—reduces criticism from employees, consumers 
and government.”). 
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requirement that fiduciaries maximize shareholder profits or wealth.25  
Thus, corporate decision makers may consider and affirmatively cater 
to the interests of all of the firm’s various constituencies—its 
shareholders, to be sure, but also its employees, creditors, suppliers, 
customers, and the communities in which it operates.  In fact, 
according to a leading financial economist, managers best enhance 
long-term firm value (and thus long-term shareholder wealth) by 
reaching decisions and conducting firm business in this broader-
minded way.26 
The modern business judgment rule affirms this view of corporate 
governance and fiduciaries’ obligations.  Under the business 
judgment rule, courts respect fiduciaries’ business judgments so long 
as these managers act loyally, in good faith, and according to the 
procedural requirements of the duty of care.27  The duty of care 
 
25 The incorrect view that fiduciaries must maximize shareholder wealth is 
unfortunately quite common.  See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 3, § 1.4(B), at 20–23, § 
9.2–.3, at 410–29.  For refutation of this position, see Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, 
A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 299–302 (1999); Einer 
Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 736–
37 (2005); Thomas W. Joo, Race, Corporate Law, and Shareholder Value, 54 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 351, 361 (2004); Ian B. Lee, Corporate Law, Profit Maximization, and the 
“Responsible” Shareholder, 10 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 31, 33–36 (2005); Lawrence E. 
Mitchell & Theresa A. Gabaldon, If I Only Had a Heart: Or, How Can We Identify a 
Corporate Morality, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1645, 1666–67 (2002); Tara J. Radin, Stakeholders 
and Sustainability: An Argument for Responsible Corporate Decision-Making, 31 WM. & 
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 363, 389–90 (2007); Sneirson, Green Is Good, supra note 
1, at 995–1007; Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & 
BUS. REV. 163, 168–72 (2008).  Some Delaware cases seemingly require that corporate 
decisions aim to benefit the firm’s shareholders, however remotely, see, e.g., Revlon, Inc. 
v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (“A board may 
have regard for various constituencies in discharging its responsibilities, provided there are 
rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders.”), although this requirement is both 
difficult to enforce and in any event usually met.  Smith, supra note 8, at 1002 (calling the 
“shareholder primacy norm . . . both unenforced and unenforceable”); Sneirson, Green Is 
Good, supra note 1, at 1005 (noting that the business judgment rule renders any 
requirement to enhance or maximize shareholder wealth “unenforceable and 
meaningless”). 
26 Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate 
Objective Function, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., FALL 2001, at 8–9, 16–17.  This comports with 
studies and meta-studies demonstrating a positive correlation between corporate social 
responsibility and profitability.  See Sneirson, Doing Well, supra note 2, at 440 & n.3; see 
also Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A 
Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1439 (1993) (“In most 
situations, shareholder and nonshareholder constituency interests coincide.”). 
27 William T. Allen et al., Function over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review 
in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 1287, 1297–98 (2001) (describing the 
business judgment rule as “an expression of a policy of non-review of a board of directors’ 
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entails acting without a conflict of interest, conscientiously, on the 
basis of reasonably full information, and with a good-faith belief that 
a decision will serve the firm’s best interests.28  If these predicates are 
met, business decisions, including green business decisions that may 
depart from a wealth-maximizing objective, should both enjoy 
abstention-like deference and withstand legal challenges.29 
Jurisdictions are more or less uniform in this approach, subject to 
two minor qualifications.  First, some jurisdictions—notably 
Delaware and states with large business centers like New York—have 
better-developed corporate law than others.30  As a result, those 
states’ fiduciary duty standards and business judgment rules are very 
well defined and more predictably applied.  States without such 
precedents pose at least a risk that disinterested, procedurally careful, 
 
decision”); see also Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885–86 (2d Cir. 1982) (presenting 
rationales for the business judgment rule).  For a discussion of whether the business 
judgment rule should apply to corporate officers or just to directors, compare Lyman P.Q. 
Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. LAW. 439 (2005), 
which argues that the rule should not apply to officers, with BAINBRIDGE, supra note 3, § 
6.4(D), at 285–86, which notes the divided precedents and concludes that “the better view 
is that officers are eligible for the protections of the business judgment rule,” and Gantler 
v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708–09 (Del. 2009), which explicitly holds that directors’ and 
officers’ fiduciary duties are identical. 
28 Sneirson, Doing Well, supra note 2, at 457–61 (arguing also that the duty of care’s 
reasonably full information component requires fiduciaries to assess and consider the 
effects on the firm’s nonshareholder constituencies). 
29 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 3, § 6.2, at 244 (considering the business judgment rule 
as an abstention doctrine).  One seeming departure from these principles is the Revlon, 
Inc., line of takeover cases.  See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 
506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).  Under Revlon, where a company will no longer continue as a 
going concern, the Delaware Supreme Court requires that the company’s board obtain the 
best sale price it reasonably can for the company and thus maximize shareholder returns.  
Id. at 182.  In Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., the Court extended 
the Revlon holding to factual situations where, following a merger, the resulting entity is to 
be substantially owned and controlled by a single majority shareholder.  See Paramount 
Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 36–41 (Del. 1993).  In Revlon 
situations, it is perfectly consistent with the above principles to obligate boards to eschew 
other constituencies and focus exclusively on shareholders, as there will be little left to the 
company following its sale and breakup.  In relatively rare QVC situations, it is only a 
minor departure “to obligate boards to afford a similar economic benefit to its 
shareholders.”  Sneirson, Green Is Good, supra note 1, at 1007 & n.105.  In any event, the 
vast majority of green business decisions involve operational issues, not takeovers, and 
thus the Revlon line of cases, while interesting, should not apply. 
30 This is one reason firms prefer to incorporate in Delaware.  See supra text 
accompanying note 13. 
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good-faith business decisions will not be as respected as they would 
under other corporate law regimes.31 
Second, thirty-three states have codified the concept that corporate 
fiduciaries may consider more than just shareholders when 
determining the firm’s best interests.32  About two-thirds of these so-
called “other constituency statutes” are generally applicable, 
providing an extra measure of comfort where corporate managers 
make decisions that benefit the firm’s nonshareholder 
constituencies.33  The remaining third are limited to the takeover 
context and therefore only offer this statutory protection to a narrower 
class of corporate decisions.34 
 
31 See, e.g., Naito v. Naito, 35 P.3d 1068, 1083 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) (reciting the 
business judgment rule but then modifying the company’s dividend policy to guard against 
further minority shareholder oppression); Colvin v. Colvin, No. 05-409-AA, 2007 WL 
2248160, at *11–15 (D. Or. Aug. 1, 2007) (reciting the business judgment rule but then 
substituting the court’s judgment for the judgment of the corporate manager).  Indeed, one 
of the functions of the business judgment rule, and corporate standards of review 
generally, is to minimize the risk of judicial errors.  Allen et al., supra note 27, at 1294, 
1296–97. 
32 The Illinois statute is typical.  It provides: 
In discharging the duties of their respective positions, the board of directors, 
committees of the board, individual directors and individual officers may, in 
considering the best long term and short term interests of the corporation, 
consider the effects of any action (including without limitation, action which may 
involve or relate to a change or potential change in control of the corporation) 
upon employees, suppliers and customers of the corporation or its subsidiaries, 
communities in which offices or other establishments of the corporation or its 
subsidiaries are located, and all other pertinent factors. 
805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8.85 (West 2009).  Most of the states that enacted these 
provisions did so during the surge of corporate takeover activity in the 1980s, often to help 
local corporations fend off out-of-state suitors.  Sneirson, Green Is Good, supra note 1, at 
997–98. 
33 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0830(3) (West 2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-202(b)(5) 
(West 2009); HAW. REV. STAT. § 414-221(b) (2009); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8.85 (2009); 
IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(d) (West 2009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-C, § 832(6) 
(2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 65 (West 2009); MINN. STAT. § 302A.251(5) 
(2008); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-8.30 (West 2009); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2432(2) 
(2008); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78-138(4) (West 2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-1(2) 
(West 2009); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-35(D) (West 2009); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 
717(b) (McKinney 2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-50(6) (2009); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. §§ 1701.13(F)(7), 1701.59(A), (D), (E) (West 2009); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 
515 (West 2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 8.30 (2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-727.1 
(West 2009); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.0827 (West 2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-
830(e) (2009). 
34 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-2702 (2009); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-756(d) 
(West 2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-1602 (2009); IOWA CODE ANN. § 490.1108A (West 
2008); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.12-210(4) (West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
12:92(G) (2008); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-104(b)(9) (West 2009); MO. 
 500 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88, 491 
These slight variations notwithstanding, green businesses have had 
little reason to prefer one jurisdiction to another when deciding where 
to incorporate and whether to reincorporate in another state.  Given 
the trend toward green businesses and practices, a state offering 
green-business-friendly corporate laws could distinguish itself and 
attract green business charters, their associated revenues, and perhaps 
other economic benefits.35  Oregon is well situated to compete in this 
“race to the left” and has already begun efforts to position itself as 
“the Delaware of green business.”  The next Part of this Article 
details these efforts and proposes a comprehensive set of provisions 
designed to make the corporate laws of Oregon, or any other state, 
more amenable to green business. 
II 
GREENING A CORPORATE CODE 
In 2006, a group of Portland business lawyers set out to make 
Oregon’s corporate laws more amenable to green business.36  The 
group’s first legislative project became law in 2007, amending 
Oregon’s corporate code to permit Oregon corporations to include 
provisions in their charters authorizing or directing that the firm be 
operated in an environmentally and socially responsible manner.37  
The amendment codifies the triple bottom-line concept discussed 
above,38 while also enabling Oregon firms to explicitly opt into a 
sustainable or green corporate-governance structure. 
 
ANN. STAT. § 351.347(1) (West 2009); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.357 (2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 
7-5.2-8 (2008); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-33-4 (2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-103-204 
(West 2009). 
35 In addition to raising franchise tax revenue and fees, green corporate laws may create 
business for local law firms and perhaps entice companies to locate their operations in the 
particular state. 
36 The group—a subset of the Oregon Lawyers for a Sustainable Future—includes Dick 
Roy, formerly of Stoel Rives LLP and currently the managing director of the Center for 
Earth Leadership, and Portland business attorneys from most of the city’s major law firms.  
The author joined the group in 2008. 
37 See H.R. 2826, 74th Legis. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007) (codified at OR. REV. 
STAT. § 60.047(2)(e) (2009)).  The statute is the first of its kind.  For a fuller discussion of 
Oregon House Bill 2826 and its implications, see Sneirson, Green Is Good, supra note 1, 
at 1019–20; Alison Torbitt, Comment, Implementing Corporate Climate Change 
Responsibility: Possible State Legislative and SEC Responses to Climate Change Through 
Corporate Law Reform, 88 OR. L. REV. 581 (2009), which criticizes the law as too weak. 
38 See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text. 
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The group’s second project involves Oregon’s other constituency 
statute.39  The Oregon other constituency statute is currently limited 
to the corporate takeover context; that is, the law only expressly 
permits corporate decision makers to consider the interests of 
nonshareholder constituencies like employees, customers, suppliers, 
and communities when evaluating the merits of a proposal to acquire 
the company.40  By removing this limitation and making the statute 
generally applicable, the proposed legislation would clarify uneven 
Oregon law on the business judgment rule; bring the state in line with 
the majority of jurisdictions with an other constituency statute; and, 
on some level, encourage directors of Oregon corporations—and their 
attorneys—to view the interests of their businesses more broadly.41 
By building on these efforts, Oregon can lay claim to having the 
greenest corporate laws of any American jurisdiction.  This niche is a 
natural fit for the state: Oregon is already considered a leader in 
sustainable products, services, and practices, including green building 
and renewable energy;42 the state’s legal community boasts expertise 
in each of these areas;43 and Oregon’s citizenry tends to value nature 
and the outdoors.  Oregon Governor Theodore Kulongoski, as a 
 
39 See H.R. 2829, 75th Legis. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2009). 
40 See OR. REV. STAT. § 60.357 (2009).  In the nontakeover context, such 
considerations are permissible as a matter of decisional corporate law.  See supra notes 
25–29 and accompanying text. 
41 See cases cited supra note 31 (showing inconsistent business judgment rule decisions 
in Oregon).  The proposed legislation also specifies “economic, environmental, and social 
considerations,” a reference to the triple bottom-line concept.  See Or. H.R. 2829.  For the 
author’s testimony in support of the bill, see Hearing on H.R. 2829 Before the H. 
Sustainability & Economic Development Comm., 75th Legis. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 
2009) (on file with author) (written testimony of Judd F. Sneirson, Assistant Professor, 
University of Oregon School of Law) [hereinafter Sneirson Testimony].  The House 
Sustainability and Economic Development Committee will hold further hearings on the 
bill in the coming legislative session. 
42 OR. BUS. PLAN STEERING COMM., 2009 OREGON BUSINESS PLAN POLICY 
PLAYBOOK, INITIATIVE AND CLUSTER GUIDE 8, 10–11 (2009) [hereinafter 2009 OR. BUS. 
PLAN], available at http://www.oregonbusinessplan.org/pdf/2008 OBP POLICY 
PLAYBOOK, INITIATIVE AND CLUSTER GUIDE-FINAL.pdf (“No other state has as 
long and as deep a commitment [to sustainability] as our state.”); see also OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 184.423 (2009) (setting forth Oregon’s goals for sustainability); Floyd, supra note 23, at 
352. 
43 Several Portland law firms, including Stoel Rives LLP, Miller Nash LLP, Lane 
Powell PC, Ater Wynne LLP, and Tonkon Torp LLP, have designated sustainability or 
related practice groups, and two of these practice groups maintain active law blogs on the 
topic.  See Stoel Rives LLP, Renewable + Law, http://www.lawofrenewableenergy.com 
(last visited Jan. 7, 2010); Tonkon Torp LLP, Sustainability Law Blog, 
http://www.sustainabilitylawblog.com (last visited Jan. 7, 2010). 
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member of the Oregon Business Plan Leadership Committee, has 
even featured sustainable industries as the centerpiece of the state’s 
business plan for economic development.44  Green corporate laws 
would only complement these efforts.45 
This Article proposes further green reforms to corporate law.  The 
first group of proposals contains generally applicable provisions 
designed to clarify that firms may pursue green business plans and 
practices under current corporate law.  The second group comprises a 
set of provisions for firms electing to attain “green corporation” status 
and operate according to a greener and stricter set of standards. 
The provisions are all optional; they do not force sustainability, 
green business practices, or corporate social responsibility on any 
firm.  Rather, they encourage green businesses and practices by 
offering both an added measure of protection for voluntary green 
business decisions and a structure for firms wishing to commit 
themselves to green corporate governance.  There are two reasons for 
this approach.  First, current corporate law permits, but does not 
require, firms to engage in social responsibility, and the proposals 
leave what is viewed as a highly successful area of the law intact.46  
The proposals fit within this enabling framework.47  The second 
reason is practical: to have any realistic chance of enactment, even in 
a state like Oregon with a receptive political climate, green reforms to 
corporate law must not negatively impact the state’s existing 
corporations or frighten them out of the jurisdiction.48  This 
 
44 2009 OR. BUS. PLAN, supra note 42, at 8–9. 
45 Of course, other states may pursue green reforms to corporate law as well.  States 
such as California, Colorado, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin share many of 
Oregon’s characteristics and would likewise be logical candidates for these reforms. 
46 See JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A SHORT 
HISTORY OF A REVOLUTIONARY IDEA, at xv (2003) (“The most important organization in 
the world is the company: the basis of the prosperity of the West and the best hope for the 
future of the rest of the world.”); William T. Allen, Modern Corporate Governance and 
the Erosion of the Business Judgment Rule in Delaware Corporate Law 1 (Osgoode Hall 
Law Sch., Comparative Research in Law & Political Econ., Research Paper No. 06/2008, 
2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstractid=1105591 (“The modern business corporation 
is the instrumentality within which the greatest part of our economic activity occurs, in 
which jobs and wealth are created and through which, to a great extent, our national 
competitiveness is maintained.”). 
47 See WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF 
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 92 (3d ed. 2009) (“The typical corporation statute of today . . . 
is a nonregulatory, ‘enabling’ statute with few mandatory features.”). 
48 For a more dramatic call for corporate law reform, see KENT GREENFIELD, THE 
FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 
(2006). 
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admittedly limits the potential of the proposed reforms but makes 
their adoption and therefore their impact more likely. 
A.  General Provisions 
The first category of green corporate law reforms consists of two 
provisions, the first of which is a generally applicable other 
constituency statute.  As noted above, a majority of American 
jurisdictions have such provisions expressly permitting corporate 
fiduciaries to consider the interests of shareholder and nonshareholder 
constituencies alike when making company decisions.49  To become a 
little greener, a jurisdiction without an other constituency statute 
should adopt one, and a jurisdiction with an other constituency statute 
limited to takeover situations should remove the limitation.50  
Particularly in a state where corporate law on the business judgment 
rule is sparse or uneven,51 a generally applicable other constituency 
statute would offer corporate managers a welcomed assurance that 
they may view the firm’s interests broadly by considering more than 
just shareholders when conducting company business.52 
A second generally applicable provision helpful to attracting green 
business to a state is a statutory provision explicitly granting firms the 
power to conduct business in a sustainable and socially responsible 
manner.  Corporate codes already contain lengthy provisions 
conferring specific powers on firms,53 including the power to make 
charitable gifts.54  While firms can already conduct business in a 
 
49 See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text. 
50 In both cases, the statute should specify that corporate fiduciaries may consider the 
environmental, social, and financial implications of corporate decisions.  See supra notes 
14–20 and accompanying text (discussing the triple bottom line); supra note 41 (quoting 
the triple-bottom-line language in the proposed revision to Oregon’s other constituency 
statute); infra Appendix § x. 
51 See supra note 31 (questioning the reliability of the business judgment rule in 
Oregon). 
52 Indeed, in a state without a developed business judgment rule, a generally applicable 
other constituency statute would clarify this point of law and benefit all corporations and 
their shareholders.  See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885–86 (2d Cir. 1982) (demonstrating 
the shareholder benefits of the business judgment rule); ALLEN ET AL., supra note 47, at 
257 (suggesting that director exculpation provisions are similarly in shareholders’ best 
interests). 
53 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122 (2009); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.02 (2002). 
54 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(9) (2009) (conferring the power to “[m]ake 
donations for the public welfare or for charitable, scientific or educational purposes, and in 
time of war or other national emergency in aid thereof”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 
3.02(13) (2002) (authorizing similar donations). 
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sustainable, socially responsible way, specifically enumerating the 
power to do so would, like an other constituency statute, clarify this 
point and perhaps encourage hesitant firms to act more responsibly.55 
B.  Provisions for Electing Corporations 
A second, more ambitious group of green corporate law reforms 
consists of provisions specially designed for, and only applicable to, 
electing green corporations.  Modeled on the close corporation 
subchapters in some corporate codes,56 the green corporate provisions 
presented here form a cohesive legislative scheme for firms wishing 
to opt into a stricter, greener model of corporate governance. 
The provisions begin by clarifying that they apply to electing green 
corporations only,57 and set forth a procedure for firms to elect green 
corporation status.58  According to the proposed legislation, a 
company must include in its charter both a statement that the firm is a 
green corporation59 and a statement that the business shall be 
conducted in a financially, environmentally, and socially responsible 
manner.60  Therefore, to qualify as a green corporation, a firm must 
commit itself to sustainability in its core corporate document and do 
so publicly, putting would-be shareholders and others on notice of 
how the firm is to be managed.61 
 
55 See infra Appendix § y. 
56 See tit. 8, §§ 341–356. 
57 See infra Appendix §§ 1, 11; cf. tit. 8, § 341(a) (“This subchapter applies to all close 
corporations, as defined . . . . Unless a corporation elects to become a close corporation 
under this subchapter in the manner prescribed in this subchapter, it shall be subject in all 
respects to this chapter, except this subchapter.”); tit. 8, § 356 (“This subchapter shall not 
be deemed to repeal any statute or rule of law which is or would be applicable to any 
corporation which is organized under this chapter but is not a close corporation.”). 
58 See infra Appendix §§ 2-4; cf. tit. 8, §§ 342–344 (setting forth the same procedure for 
a close corporation). 
59 See infra Appendix § 2; cf. tit. 8, § 343(1) (requiring a statement in articles of 
incorporation for a close corporation). 
60 See supra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing Oregon House Bill 2826, which 
expressly permits firms to include such language in their charters). 
61 See Hearing on H.R. 2826 Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 74th Legis. Assem., Reg. 
Sess., Exhibit B, at 2 (Or. 2007) (written testimony of Jeffrey C. Wolfstone, Partner, Lane 
Powell PC, and General Counsel, Nau, Inc.) (describing a sustainability commitment in a 
corporate charter as “baked in” to a firm’s DNA).  To the extent the firm’s green business 
management philosophy is presented to investors up front, it becomes both part of the 
investors’ hypothetical bargain with management and legitimate under the “nexus of 
contracts” conception of the corporation.  See Sneirson, Green Is Good, supra note 1, at 
1016–17 (relating the nexus of contracts view of the corporation to sustainability).  For a 
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Next, the provisions require that green corporations confer board 
representation on nonshareholder constituencies, such as the 
company’s employees and the community in which the company 
conducts most of its operations.62  The idea of “constituency 
directors” for nonshareholder groups or for different classes of 
investors is not new,63 and studies have shown that such diverse 
perspectives tend to improve the quality of group decision making.64  
In addition, as a matter of their duty of care, green corporate boards 
should consult with nonshareholder constituencies in making 
company decisions whenever possible.65  Like the proposal for 
nonshareholder board representation, such consultation tends to 
 
succinct description of the nexus of contracts theory of the corporation, see BAINBRIDGE, 
supra note 3, § 1.5, at 26. 
62 See infra Appendix § 8.  Although the proposed legislation charges these directors 
with representing their constituencies’ interests in board deliberations, these officers, like 
all directors, owe their fiduciary duties to and must act in the best interests of the entire 
enterprise.  See E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, How Many Masters Can 
a Director Serve? A Look at the Tensions Facing Constituency Directors, 63 BUS. LAW. 
761, 772–75 (2008) (advising constituency directors to beware of potential conflicts). 
63 See Marleen O’Connor, Labor’s Role in the American Corporate Governance 
Structure, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 97, 102–03 (2000) (discussing the representation 
of employees on a company’s board); Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 62, at 762 
(discussing constituency directors representing preferred stockholders); Brian Hamer, 
Note, Serving Two Masters: Union Representation on Corporate Boards of Directors, 81 
COLUM. L. REV. 639, 639–40 (1981).  For a comparative perspective, see Mark J. 
Loewenstein, Stakeholder Protection in Germany and Japan, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1673 
(2002), which notes that German and Japanese firms reserve supervisory board 
representation for employee representatives.  There are also American examples.  See 
UAL Corp., Restated Certificate of Incorporation of UAL Corporation (Feb. 1, 2006), 
available at http://media.corporate-ir.net/media_files/IROL/83/83680/governance/UAL 
_Restated.PDF (providing for pilot and machinist board representation on the United 
Airlines board). 
64 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 3, at 208–09 & nn.4–5; Kent Greenfield, Debate, 
Proposition: Saving the World with Corporate Law, 57 EMORY L.J. 948, 957–58, 978–83 
(2008) (extolling the “benefits of group decisionmaking”); see also David A. Carter et al., 
Corporate Governance, Board Diversity, and Firm Value, 38 FIN. REV. 33, 51 (2003) 
(finding a statistically significant relationship between board diversity and firm value); 
Steven A. Ramirez, Diversity and the Boardroom, 6 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 85, 99–100 
(2000) (citing studies on diversity and group decision making).  But see Lissa Lamkin 
Broome & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Signaling Through Board Diversity: Is Anyone 
Listening?, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 431, 433 nn.4–5 (2008) (citing conflicting empirical 
studies). 
65 See Sneirson, Doing Well, supra note 2, at 468–77 (arguing that corporate fiduciaries 
must, as a matter of their duty of care, consider all reasonably available material 
information in their decision making, including the impact of their decisions on 
nonshareholder constituencies). 
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produce better-informed, and substantively better and greener, 
business decisions.66 
And third, the green reforms to corporate law require electing 
corporations to make periodic triple bottom-line disclosures that 
account for the firm’s recent activities in financial, environmental, 
and social terms.67  Such disclosures would enable investors to make 
informed decisions about both whether and where to invest and how 
to vote in corporate elections.68  Green disclosures would also serve 
to disseminate information on sustainable business practices, 
including sustainable manufacturing processes, allowing other firms 
to learn from them, perhaps improve upon them, and likewise become 
more sustainable.69  Most importantly, these green disclosures would 
“affect corporate conduct.”70  By forcing social and environmental 
performance out into the open alongside financial results, managers 
gain a greater incentive to “reduce those impacts that shareholders 
could interpret as negative”71 and do more “for their communities, 
their employees, and the long-term welfare of the company.”72  Many 
 
66 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board?: Group Decisionmaking in Corporate 
Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 19–27 (2002) (examining group decision-making 
literature in cognitive psychology and behavioral economics and concluding that better 
information and deliberation allow boards to produce better decisions); see also Jensen, 
supra note 26, at 9 (“[T]he process of [assessing stakeholder interests] can add significant 
value by helping managers understand both the company’s strategy and the drivers of 
value in their businesses.”). 
67 See infra Appendix § 9; see also supra notes 16–20 and accompanying text 
(discussing the triple bottom line in general and as an accounting structure). 
68 See Williams, supra note 21, at 1210–11. 
69 Although it would seem counterintuitive, some firms already share such information.  
See Mary Tripsas, Everybody in the Pool of Green Innovation, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2009, 
at B5. 
70 Cf. Williams, supra note 21, at 1210–11 (noting that Congress intended the securities 
laws’ disclosure requirements “to affect corporate conduct” and arguing that corporate 
social responsibility disclosures will improve companies’ social and environmental 
performance). 
71 Id. at 1295 (positing that “there would be a ‘shrinking quality’ to actions that 
managers would be willing to take in relative secrecy, but would not want to disclose to 
their shareholders or to have published on the front page of the New York Times” (quoting 
Felix Frankfurter, The Federal Securities Act: II, FORTUNE, Aug. 1933, at 55)); see also 
Felix Frankfurter, supra, at 53, 55 (“[P]ublicity is potent . . . . to force knowledge of 
[excessive commissions and salaries] into the open is largely to restrain their happening.  
Many practices safely pursued in private lose their justification in public.”). 
72 Williams, supra note 21, at 1295–96 (“Under expanded social disclosure, these 
actions would all appear in the ‘positive effects’ column of the social accounting ledger, 
whereas currently they only show up in the ‘negative income’ column of the financial 
accounting ledger.”). 
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states currently supplement federal securities laws with their own 
financial reporting requirements,73 and many businesses already 
voluntarily make public “corporate responsibility” disclosures in one 
form or another.74  Requiring these disclosures of green corporations 
would not only lead to more thoughtful, sustainable business practices 
and procedures, the requirement would also provide a means for 
holding green corporations to their commitments. 
In enforcing these proposed provisions consistently with existing 
corporate law, courts should largely defer to corporate fiduciaries’ 
informed, disinterested, good-faith business decisions, even if the 
choices appear to be too sustainable, or not sustainable enough, for 
some of the company’s stakeholder groups.  To be sure, this detracts 
from the mandatory language in a green corporation’s charter 
directing the firm to conduct its business sustainably.  However, this 
deference also avoids the prospect of courts or other governmental 
bodies passing judgment on and second-guessing green corporations’ 
business decisions.75  Instead these reforms are to be largely self-
enforcing: if a green corporation fails to comply with its disclosure or 
other obligations, then it should lose its green corporation status and 
the benefit of any associated perks.76 
The mere adoption of these corporate law reforms, together with 
any attendant publicity, may be enough to attract green businesses to 
incorporate or reincorporate as a formal “green corporation” within a 
jurisdiction.77  Firms may also seek green corporation status to curry 
favor with consumers who, according to several studies, prefer green 
firms and their products and services.78  A state can enhance this 
 
73 See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 16.20 (2002). 
74 See supra note 20 (citing the corporate responsibility websites of several major U.S. 
companies).  For an innovative application of the federal securities laws to corporate social 
responsibility, see Williams, supra note 21, at 1199, which interprets the federal securities 
laws to require disclosures about “management’s policies and practices with respect to 
social and environmental issues” and thereby achieve “corporate social transparency.” 
75 The approach here thus differs from that of the B Corporation private certification 
model, in which firms must meet certain social and environmental standards, demonstrate 
their compliance, and possibly undergo an audit.  See generally Sneirson, Green Is Good, 
supra note 1, at 1017–19; Certified B Corp., About B Corp., http://www.bcorporation.net/ 
about (last visited Jan. 8, 2010). 
76 These perks might include tax incentives.  See infra notes 80–81 and accompanying 
text. 
77 In other words, “If you build it, they will come.”  Cf. FIELD OF DREAMS (Universal 
Pictures 1989) (“If you build it, he will come.”). 
78 Janet E. Kerr, Sustainability Meets Profitability: The Convenient Truth of How the 
Business Judgment Rule Protects a Board’s Decision to Engage in Social 
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reputational benefit by creating a “green corporation” mark, like the 
USDA organic symbol, and licensing it for use by electing firms.79  
Such a mark could also aid socially responsible investors, money 
managers, and trustees with specific investment directives in more 
easily identifying and screening firms. 
States can also encourage green business incorporations through 
financial incentives such as reduced or eliminated franchise tax 
rates.80  States already exempt certain types of corporations from 
franchise tax obligations,81 and any revenues foregone might be more 
than offset by both green businesses and jobs that locate in the state 
and the, admittedly, intangible good that those green corporations do 
both within and without a specific jurisdiction’s borders. 
C.  Concerns 
Recent experience involving relatively innocuous corporate law 
reforms suggests that the proposals made here may give some pause.  
For example, Nike, Inc.—perhaps the largest Oregon corporation—
expressed concern about the proposal to broaden Oregon’s other 
constituency statute, fearing unintended consequences to its 
governing law.82  And in California—one of the few states without 
any other constituency statute—the legislature recently overcame 
 
Entrepreneurship, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 623, 664–65 (2007) (citing studies measuring “a 
strong positive relationship between [Corporate Social Responsibility] behaviors and 
consumers’ reactions to a company’s products and services”); see also Ray Fisman et al., 
Corporate Social Responsibility: Doing Well by Doing Good? 16 (Sept. 2005) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/fordcenter/ 
conferences/ethics06/heal.pdf (noting that corporate social responsibility is more 
positively related to profitability in advertising-intensive, consumer-oriented industries).  
This may be the case in business-to-business transactions as well.  See ELKINGTON, supra 
note 16, at 110, 119 (relating anecdotes). 
79 See Sneirson, Green Is Good, supra note 1, at 1017 & n.159 (discussing the “B 
Corporation” private certification system and associated mark for sustainable businesses 
and noting similar private certification marks, including LEED building designations). 
80 See infra Appendix § 10. 
81 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 501 (2009). 
82 Conversation with Jim Carter, Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Nike, Inc., in Eugene, 
Or. (Apr. 18, 2009).  Nike is otherwise a strong proponent of sustainability and sustainable 
business practices.  See Sneirson, Green Is Good, supra note 1, at 994 (profiling Nike’s 
sustainability philosophy and efforts); Tripsas, supra note 69 (noting Nike’s involvement 
in the Green Xchange initiative for sharing sustainability innovations).  When Oregon 
enacted House Bill 2826, similar concerns arose.  See Andy Giegerich, Some Biz Lawyers 
Worry over Sustainability Effort, PORTLAND BUS. J., Apr. 18, 2008, available at 
http://boston.bizjournals.com/portland/stories/2008/04/21/focus7.html (interviewing 
lawyers wary of changes to the Oregon corporate code). 
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opposition from the business section of the state bar83 and others84 
and passed a generally applicable other constituency statute, only to 
have Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger veto the bill.85  Governor 
Schwarzenegger’s veto message articulates some of the same 
concerns that arose in Oregon, including the concern that the bill 
“could produce unknown ramifications.”86 
Such concerns are misguided.  A broadened other constituency 
statute would not upset current corporate law in any way; indeed, in 
the many jurisdictions that have adopted one, it has had no such 
effect.87  Rather, such provisions merely bolster the business 
judgment rule and ensure that boards’ informed, disinterested, good-
faith business decisions will be respected if challenged in court.88  
Particularly in jurisdictions like Oregon, where the business judgment 
rule finds inconsistent support, a broad other constituency statute 
offers welcomed, needed clarity to this bedrock corporate law 
principle.  The statute would also help dispel the notion that corporate 
 
83 Letter from W. Derrick Britt, Vice Chair of Legislation, Bus. Law Section, State Bar 
of Cal., to the Office of Governmental Affairs (Apr. 14, 2008), available at 
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/sections/buslaw/corporations/ab-2944-statement-of   
-position-final.pdf (opposing the legislation on the ground that it would make directors less 
accountable, but also noting that no “California law . . . prevents directors [from] adopting 
socially responsible corporate policies”). 
84 See Amy Westervelt, New Calif. Bill Aims to Allow Double-Bottom Line, 
SUSTAINABLE INDUSTRIES, May 2008, http://www.sustainableindustries.com/ 
breakingnews/19183154.html (noting opposition from the California Chamber of 
Commerce and the California Manufacturers and Technology Association). 
85 See Letter from Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor, State of Cal., to the Members of 
the Cal. State Assembly (Sept. 30, 2008), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/07    
-08/bill/asm/ab_2901-2950/ab_2944_vt_20080930.html. 
86 See id.  Governor Schwarzenegger’s veto message also reveals a flawed 
understanding of California corporate law.  In his summary, the governor writes that the 
“bill would permit corporate directors to consider a variety of new factors other than 
strictly financial return when making business decisions on behalf of a corporation.”  Id.  
Of course, California corporate directors may already consider such nonfinancial factors 
when making company decisions, as the corporation committee of the state bar noted in its 
opposition memorandum.  Letter from W. Derrick Britt, supra note 83, at 4.  Such 
considerations are also protected under California’s business judgment rule.  See, e.g., 
Lamden v. La Jolla Shores Clubdominium Homeowners Ass’n, 980 P.2d 940, 944–45 
(Cal. 1999) (setting forth California’s business judgment rule); Biren v. Equal. Emergency 
Med. Group, Inc., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 325, 330–32 (Ct. App. 2002) (same). 
87 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 3, § 9.2, at 415–16 (opining that other constituency 
statutes have not changed corporate directors’ fiduciary duties). 
88 See supra notes 31–34 and accompanying text.  Indeed, the firms opposing other 
constituency statutes in Oregon and California should affirmatively desire added 
clarification and support for the business judgment rule as it would insulate their boards’ 
decisions from shareholder suits premised on mere mismanagement. 
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law obligates fiduciaries to maximize shareholder wealth and 
embolden them to view their firms and responsibilities more 
broadly.89 
A provision expressly conferring the power to engage in 
sustainable business practices on corporations would likewise work 
no harm to current corporate law.  Firms may already conduct their 
operations in this manner, in fact many do, and an express grant of 
authority would simply offer explicit statutory support for their 
activities.90 
The separate set of green corporate law provisions only applicable 
to electing firms should likewise cause no concern for other, 
nonelecting corporations.  Like close-corporation-specific laws, the 
proposed green corporate law provisions make clear both that they do 
not apply to nonelecting corporations, and that no generally 
applicable corporate law provision is to be affected by them.91 
CONCLUSION 
By enacting the proposed green reforms to corporate law and 
creating a body of special provisions for companies electing green 
corporation status, a state like Oregon can both make its corporate 
laws more amenable to firms wishing to pursue green business 
strategies and attract firms wishing to commit to a greener model of 
corporate governance.  Further, if other states follow suit and green 
their corporate codes as well, corporations in these jurisdictions may 
more confidently engage in green business practices and do their part 
to make business and the world more sustainable. 
 
89 Sneirson Testimony, supra note 41 (discussing the need for an expanded other 
constituency statute). 
90 See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
91 See infra Appendix §§ 1, 11; cf. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 341, 356 (2009). 
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APPENDIX 
[subsection to be added to an other constituency statute]: 
“(x) environmental, social, and financial considerations that are 
reasonably regarded as appropriate to the responsible conduct of the 
corporation’s business . . .” 
 
[subsection to be added to a list of specific powers like DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8, § 122 (2009) or MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.02 (2002)]: 
“(y) conduct its business in a sustainable and socially responsible 
manner.” 
 
[subchapter to be added]: 
Subchapter XX: Green Corporations, Special Provisions 
 
§ 1. Law applicable to green corporations. 
This subchapter applies to all green corporations, as defined in § 2 
of this subchapter.  Unless a corporation elects to become a green 
corporation under this subchapter in the manner prescribed, it shall be 
subject in all respects to this chapter, except this subchapter. 
 
§ 2. Green corporation defined; contents of articles of 
incorporation. 
A green corporation is a corporation organized under this chapter 
whose articles of incorporation contain the provisions required by §   
[. . .] of this chapter and, in addition, (a) contain a heading stating the 
name of the corporation and that it is a green corporation; and (b) 
provide that the corporation shall conduct its business in a sustainable 
and socially responsible manner. 
 
§ 3. Formation of a green corporation. 
A green corporation shall be formed in accordance with § [. . .] of 
this chapter, except that its articles of incorporation shall contain the 
provisions required by § 2 of this subchapter. 
 
§ 4. Election of an existing corporation to become a green 
corporation. 
Any corporation organized under this chapter may become a green 
corporation under this subchapter by executing, acknowledging, and 
filing, in accordance with § [. . .] of this title, amended articles of 
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incorporation that contain both a statement electing to become a green 
corporation and the provisions required by § 2 of this subchapter.  
Such amendment shall be adopted in accordance with the 
requirements of §§ [. . .] of this title. 
 
§ 5. Limitations on continuation of green corporation status. 
A green corporation continues to be such and to be subject to this 
subchapter until: 
(a) it files amended articles of incorporation with the Secretary of 
State deleting the provisions required by § 2 of this subchapter to be 
stated in the articles of incorporation to qualify it as a green 
corporation or 
(b) any of the provisions or conditions required by §§ 2, 8, and 9 
of this subchapter has in fact been breached, and neither the 
corporation nor any of its shareholders takes the steps required to 
prevent such loss of status or to remedy such breach. 
 
§ 6. Voluntary termination of green corporation status by 
amendment of articles of incorporation; vote required. 
(a) A corporation may voluntarily terminate its status as a green 
corporation and cease to be subject to this subchapter by amending its 
articles of incorporation to delete therefrom the additional provisions 
required by § 2 of this subchapter.  Any such amendment shall be 
adopted and shall become effective in accordance with § [. . .] of this 
title. 
(b) The articles of incorporation of a green corporation may 
provide that, on any amendment to terminate its status as a green 
corporation, a vote greater than [. . .] shall be required, and, if the 
articles of incorporation contain such a provision, that provision shall 
not be amended, repealed, or modified by any vote less than that 
required to terminate the corporation’s status as a green corporation. 
 
§ 7. Involuntary termination of green corporation status. 
(a) If any event occurs as a result of which one or more of the 
provisions or conditions required by §§ 2, 8, and 9 of this subchapter 
has in fact been breached, the corporation’s status as a green 
corporation under this subchapter shall terminate, unless the 
corporation takes such steps as are necessary to correct the situation 
that threatens its status as a green corporation within 30 days after the 
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occurrence of the event or within 30 days after the event has been 
discovered, whichever is later. 
(b) The [court], upon the suit of the corporation or any 
stockholder, shall have jurisdiction to issue all orders necessary to 
either prevent the corporation from losing its status as a green 
corporation or restore its status as a green corporation by enjoining, or 
setting aside, any act or threatened act on the part of the corporation 
or a shareholder that would be inconsistent with any of the provisions 
or conditions required by §§ 2, 8, and 9 of this subchapter, unless it is 
an act approved in accordance with § 6 of this subchapter. 
 
§ 8. Board representation. 
(a) At least one member of the board of directors shall be chosen 
from among the corporation’s nonmanagement employees and 
represent those employees’ interests in board deliberations. 
(b) At least one member of the board of directors shall be chosen 
from the community in which the corporation conducts the majority 
of its operations and represent the community’s interests in board 
deliberations. 
 
§ 9. Annual sustainability statements. 
Green corporations organized under this subchapter shall make 
available—to their shareholders and the public—annual sustainability 
statements that describe the corporation’s financial, environmental, 
and social performance over the fiscal year.  Such statements: 
(a) shall be prepared in accordance with the current version of 
the Global Reporting Initiative Sustainability Reporting Guidelines 
or, if not, shall describe the basis of preparation; and 
(b) may be consolidated or combined statements of the 
corporation and one or more of its subsidiaries, as appropriate. 
 
§ 10. Exemption from franchise tax. 
Green corporations organized under this subchapter and meeting 
the conditions required by §§ 2, 8, and 9 of this subchapter shall be 
exempt from paying an annual tax for the corporate franchise as 
prescribed in this chapter. 
[and amend franchise tax provision accordingly] 
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§ 11. Effect of this subchapter on other laws. 
This subchapter shall not be deemed to repeal any statute or rule of 
law that is or would be applicable to any corporation that is organized 
under this chapter but is not a green corporation. 
 
